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ABSTRACT 
Telecommunications is one of our most critical national infrastructures, enabling 
many other infrastructure sectors to function.  The federal oversight structure for this 
sector, put in place by the Department of Homeland Security, relies heavily on voluntary 
cooperation between the public and private sectors.  Given that no large-scale disruption 
of the nationwide telecommunications backbone has occurred, there is no empirical 
evidence showing the effectiveness of the structure DHS has put in place. 
In an effort to gauge the effectiveness of the various existing infrastructure 
oversight structures, this thesis examines four specific roles assumed by the federal 
government and their performance in their respective sectors.  These roles and sectors are 
Owner (aviation), Customer (power), Coordinator (local telecommunications), and 
Regulator (food).  Each case is reviewed to determine the effects of the government role 
on economic impact of the disruption, the time required to restore initial operating 
capabilities, and the time required to restore full operating capabilities. 
The various cases show that the government role has little direct impact on the 
costs related to infrastructure disruptions.  The Regulator role had a negative impact on 
timelines for both initial and full restoration.  The other roles all made positive 
contributions to both restoration timelines. 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................. 1 
A. BACKGROUND................................................................................................... 1 
1. Emergence of Critical Infrastructure Protection.................................. 1 
2. Cyberspace as an Economic Enabler ..................................................... 2 
3. The Public-Private Dilemma................................................................... 3 
B. IMPORTANCE OF THIS RESEARCH ............................................................ 3 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW .................................................................................... 4 
D. METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................... 7 
II. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AS AN OWNER — 2001 AIRSPACE RESPONSE 
TO 9-11............................................................................................................................... 9 
A. BACKGROUND................................................................................................... 9 
1. Commercial Aviation 101 ........................................................................ 9 
2. The Federal Government’s Role in Overseeing the Sector ................ 10 
B. ANATOMY OF AN AVIATION SECURITY BREACH............................... 11 
1. Context of the 2001 Airspace Security Breach .................................... 11 
2. Security Breach Events and Impacts.................................................... 12 
C. CASE ANALYSIS .............................................................................................. 14 
1. Overall Analysis ..................................................................................... 14 
2. The FAA’s Dual Mandate ..................................................................... 14 
3. Impacts of Regulatory Capture ............................................................ 16 
4. Cumbersome Coordination between Federal Agencies ...................... 17 
5. Ability to Close U.S. Airspace ............................................................... 18 
6. Analysis Summary ................................................................................. 19 
III. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AS A CUSTOMER — 2003 NORTHEAST 
BLACKOUT.................................................................................................................... 21 
A. BACKGROUND................................................................................................. 21 
1. Electricity 101 ......................................................................................... 21 
2. The Federal Government’s Role in Overseeing the Grid ................... 22 
B. ANATOMY OF A BLACKOUT....................................................................... 23 
1. Context of the 2003 Northeast Blackout .............................................. 23 
2. Blackout Events and Impacts................................................................ 24 
C. CASE ANALYSIS .............................................................................................. 25 
1. Overall Analysis ..................................................................................... 25 
2. Guideline Development.......................................................................... 25 
a. Guidelines Requiring Validation of Computerized Control 
and Monitoring Systems ............................................................. 26 
b. Guidelines for Operator Training and Certification ................. 27 
c. Guidelines for Information Sharing Between Reliability 
Coordinators................................................................................ 27 
3. Compliance Evaluation.......................................................................... 28 
4. Regulatory Focus on Issues Other Than Reliability ........................... 28 
5. Analysis Summary ................................................................................. 29 
 viii
IV. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AS A COORDINATOR —  2005 
COMMUNICATIONS RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA ......................... 31 
A. BACKGROUND................................................................................................. 31 
1. Commercial Telecommunications 101 ................................................. 31 
2. The Federal Government’s Role in Overseeing the Sector ................ 32 
B. ANATOMY OF A TELECOMMUNICATIONS OUTAGE.......................... 34 
1. Context of Hurricane Katrina’s Telecommunications Impacts......... 34 
2. Telecommunications Infrastructure Events and Impacts .................. 35 
C. CASE ANALYSIS .............................................................................................. 36 
1. Overall Analysis ..................................................................................... 36 
2. Coordination of Regulation Waiver Requests ..................................... 36 
3. Coordination of Restoration Requirements......................................... 38 
4. Analysis Summary ................................................................................. 39 
V. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AS A REGULATOR —  2006 E. COLI 
OUTBREAK.................................................................................................................... 41 
A. BACKGROUND................................................................................................. 41 
1. Food Production 101 .............................................................................. 41 
2. The Federal Government’s Role in Overseeing the Sector ................ 42 
B. ANATOMY OF A FOOD-BORN ILLNESS OUTBREAK............................ 43 
1. Context of the 2006 E. Coli Outbreak .................................................. 43 
2. Outbreak Events and Impacts .............................................................. 44 
C. CASE ANALYSIS .............................................................................................. 46 
1. Overall Analysis ..................................................................................... 46 
2. Factors Contributing to Failed Prevention.......................................... 46 
a. Lax Guidance From the FDA .................................................... 46 
b. Weaknesses in the FDA Inspection Program............................ 47 
3. Factors Contributing to Slow Outbreak Response ............................. 48 
a. Cumbersome Record Keeping for Traceback Accountability ... 48 
b. Inconsistent Reporting from State and Local Entities to the 
CDC ............................................................................................. 48 
4. Analysis Summary ................................................................................. 49 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS........................................................ 51 
A. SUMMARY OF CASE STUDY VARIABLES................................................ 51 
B. CONCLUSIONS ON THE IMPACT OF THE GOVERNMENT ROLE..... 52 
1. Impact of Government Role on Cost .................................................... 52 
2. Impact of Government Role on Disruption Duration......................... 52 
C. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS/OBSERVATIONS.......................................... 53 
1. An Ounce of Prevention Really is Worth a Pound of Cure................ 53 
2. Let’s Not Relearn the Lessons of the Past............................................ 54 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY .......................................... 54 
LIST OF REFERENCES............................................................................................................ 55 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST............................................................................................... 61 
 
 ix
 LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Summary of Case Study Variables ..................................................................51 
 
 x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 As with most things I’ve accomplished in my professional career, the true heavy 
lifting necessary to finish this thesis was done by others.  First of all, thanks to my wife 
Gloria for enduring countless days with an abnormally ill-tempered husband.  Thanks for 
not throwing me out.  Thanks also go to my beautiful daughters, Amber and Lauren, who 
always say just the right things to keep this all in perspective.  Bike rides and soccer 
games helped to provide just the right diversion at just the right time.  Special thanks go 
to my advisors, Dr. Letitia Lawson and Dr. Roxanne Zolin.  Without your boundless 
patience and thoughtful prodding, the few good thoughts I had would never have found 
the way to the keyboard.  I should also thank the fellow second-floor knuckleheads for 
the daily lunch meetings, where we discussed and solved every existing Air Force 
management problem…if only The Man would listen.  Finally, the biggest thank you 
goes to the guy who stocks the library vending machines.  I would not have made it 
without the Diet Cherry Coke. 
 
 xii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 1
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
1. Emergence of Critical Infrastructure Protection 
Literally every branch of the federal government has a responsibility to protect 
some piece of America’s critical infrastructure.  These responsibilities were pulled to the 
top of the priority list in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks.  While the concept 
of protecting critical infrastructures is not new, the importance has increased with its 
linkage to national security and the focus on protecting the homeland.  The criticality of 
infrastructure has been codified in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (2006) and 
the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key 
Assets (2003).   
These documents, totaling some three hundred pages, are meant to coordinate the 
protection of infrastructures that are critical to the functioning of American society.  
These infrastructures include things often taken for granted:  food and water supplies, 
banking and financial services, electric power, and emergency services.1  Each sector is 
assigned to a specific federal agency for responsibility.  As these individual agencies 
began building their plans, it became apparent that one infrastructure sector was critical 
to many others.  Underpinning all these infrastructures is the bundle of information 
technology systems and telecommunications networks which President Bush defines as 
cyberspace.2 
                                                 
1 Department of Homeland Security, The National Infrastructure Protection Plan, Department of 
Homeland Security, Washington, DC, 2006, 17.  The entire list of infrastructures and key resources 
includes some 18 entities.  A list of the most common is given to provide a frame of reference to the reader. 
2 Department of Homeland Security, The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, Department of 
Homeland Security, Washington, DC, 2003, foreword. 
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2. Cyberspace as an Economic Enabler 
The recognition of cyberspace as a critical infrastructure sector has been hastened 
by the emergence of cyberspace as a key enabler of our national economy.  The 
information technology industry as a whole provides some three million jobs across the 
economy, many of which are among the most high-paying jobs available.3  Furthermore, 
many sectors of the economy are becoming increasingly reliant on cyberspace.  
Economists measure the economic impact of cyberspace by looking at two areas:  
business-to-consumer (B2C) and business-to-business (B2B) transactions.  While the 
overall percentage of retail sales (B2C) transacted via cyberspace in 2004 was only 2%,4 
the B2B volume was over 16% of total business transactions.5 
The ubiquity of telecommunications infrastructure has allowed many businesses 
to dramatically reduce their operating costs and completely revamp their business 
models.  In fact, many companies no longer have the capacity or physical resources to 
conduct business “the old way.”  The public-sector owned cyberspace infrastructure is 
not only critical to our national economy, but also to our federal government.  Some 95% 
of DoD communications services are provisioned by commercial providers.6  One could 
expect to find equal or greater levels of dependency across other segments of the federal 
government.  Following a disaster, this dependency leaves many government functions at 
the mercy of restoration processes used by these commercial providers. 
                                                 
3 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Labor Statistics (May 2005), Department of Labor, 
http://www.bls.gov/oes/home.htm, accessed Apr. 11. 2007. 
4 U.S. Census Bureau, Measuring the Electronic Economy, 2004, 
http://www.census.gov/econ/www/ebusiness614.htm, accessed Apr. 11, 2007. 
5 Jonathan L. Willis, “What Impact will E-Commerce Have on the US Economy?” U.S. Federal 
Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 2002, 
http://www.kansascityfed.org/Publicat/econrev/Pdf/2q04will.pdf, accessed Apr. 11, 2007.  
6 Personal conversations with communications planners at the Defense Information Systems Agency, 
documented via email on Apr. 28, 2007. 
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3. The Public-Private Dilemma 
The previous paragraphs clearly show the importance of cyberspace to our 
national economy and security.  The criticality of contributions from both the private and 
public sectors to securing cyberspace is equally clear.  However, despite increasing 
reliance on private sector companies in many critical infrastructure segments, 
government agencies have been reluctant to try innovative approaches to partner with 
industry.  David Rothkopf, former Deputy Undersecretary of Commerce for President 
Clinton, suggests that solutions to many homeland defense and anti-terrorism problems 
are available in the private sector.  According to Rothkopf, the limiting factor in 
developing these solutions is the fact that “most of the critical questions about how to 
achieve this [necessary] public-private sector cooperation have yet to be asked.”7  This 
thesis will attempt to address one of these critical questions: How best to structure the 
relationship between the players to maximize our ability to effectively reconstitute 
cyberspace infrastructure after a natural or manmade disruption. 
B. IMPORTANCE OF THIS RESEARCH 
The following literature review shows there is no shortage of research dealing 
with cyberspace.  Leaders in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) feel that the 
structures currently in place are adequate to facilitate the private-public sector 
cooperation necessary for restoration of the cyberspace infrastructure.  Cyber 
infrastructure providers do not share this view, nor do independent government reviewers 
outside DHS.  These differences, coupled with the lack of academic research directly 
related to the impact of government oversight structures on infrastructure restoration 
effectiveness, leaves responsible federal agencies with no guidelines for choosing an 
oversight structure for their sectors.  This thesis analyzes recent restoration activities to 
determine what impact, if any, different oversight structures have had on these sectors. 
                                                 
7 David J  Rothkopf, “Business Versus Terror,” Foreign Policy, May-June 2002, 58. 
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The President has pointed out that the unique characteristics of cyberspace, 
coupled with its criticality to our economy and security, demand an unprecedented level 
of partnership between the public and private sectors.  In fact, President Bush says “the 
cornerstone of America’s cyberspace security strategy is and will remain a public-private 
partnership.8  Predictably, the direct public and private sector contributors to this 
partnership could hardly differ more in their evaluations of the adequacy of the current 
oversight structures.  Independent reviews within the federal government have supported 
the private sector views that a different approach is needed.9 
The federal government is represented in this new partnership by the Department 
of Homeland Security, which believes the current oversight structures are appropriate.10  
Executives from industry service providers, a leading industry trade organization, and the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) all have more pessimistic evaluations of the 
budding partnership between government and business in cyber security.  The GAO 
points out that while DHS has published the required planning documents, they do not 
provide the level of detail necessary for industry partners to cooperate.  While 
acknowledging the difficulty of the task at hand, the GAO predicts that DHS will have a 
tough time meeting its responsibilities with its current plans.11   
These sentiments are echoed by senior executives from private-sector service 
providers and trade organizations in their testimonies to various Congressional 
committees.  Differing frames of reference notwithstanding, three common themes 
emerged from their testimonies:  1) insufficient funding for dedicated research and 
development directly related to cyber security; 2) a lack of clearly defined risk 
                                                 
8 National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, foreword. 
9 Government Accountability Office, Internet Infrastructure:  DHS Faces Challenges in Developing a 
Joint Public/Private Recovery Plan, Government Accounting Office, Washington DC, June 2006, 2-4. 
10 Ibid., 68-73. 
11 Ibid., 45-50. 
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management priorities, which wastes limited resources; and 3) a lack of clearly defined 
roles for post-disruption reconstitution of the infrastructure.12 
Given these differing views, there is little doubt that much work remains to be 
done toward solidifying this new partnership of public and private sector players in 
cyberspace infrastructure.  Fortunately, no large-scale calamity has put this structure to 
the test.  This relative calm has also left those charged with improving the current model 
with no real-world experience upon which to base any changes.   
The history of the federal government’s relationship with commercial providers of 
electronic communications is extensive.  Since the first government telegraph lines were 
sold in 1835, debates over how best to regulate this industry have surfaced repeatedly.  
The enduring focus of these debate has been how best to foster competition amongst the 
providers (especially new entrants) in order to keep the price of service low for the home 
consumer in a local market.13  As a result, this body of work offers very little theoretical 
insight into the question of how best to organize the players for effective reconstitution, 
since this new priority demands more cooperation than competition.14 
                                                 
12 Testimonies include U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on 
Economic Security, Telecommunications, and Cybersecurity, Future of DHS Cyber and 
Telecommunications Security, Testimony of Mr. David M. Barron, 13 Sep 2006; U.S. Congress,  
House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet, 
Cybersecurity Protection, Testimony of Mr. Vincent Weafer, 13 Sep 2006; and U.S. Congress, House 
Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Economic Security, Telecommunications, and 
Cybersecurity, Future of DHS Cyber and Telecommunications Security, Testimony of Mr. Paul B. Kurtz, 
13 Sep 2006.  All were accessed via Lexis/Nexis on 16 Nov 2006. 
13 Robert W. Crandall, Competition and Chaos:  US Telecommunications Since the 1996 Telecom Act, 
Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C., 2005, 156-171; Robert Britt Horwitz, The Irony of 
Regulatory Reform:  The Deregulation of American Telecommunications, Oxford University Press, New 
York, NY, 1989, 25- 69.  Horwitz attributes this focus to the fact that most regulatory agencies we have 
today were New Deal organizations, created specifically to prevent another economic disintegration like 
the Great Depression. 
14 For further information regarding this view of regulation, see the following: Macellus S. Snow, 
Marketplace for Teleccommunications:  Regulation and Deregulation in Industrialized Democracie., 
Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers, 1986, 253-295; Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, “Partial-Industry 
Regulation:  A Monopsony Standard for Consumer Protection,” California Law Review  80, 1 (January 
1992), 13-52; Anonymous, “U.S. Policy regarding Internet Governance,” The American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 99, No. 1, Jan., 2005, 258-259; Richard Klingler, The New Information Industry:  
Regulatory Challenges and the First Amendmen., Brookings Institutions Press, Washington, DC, 1996, 44-
68; Robert W. Crandall and Kenneth Flamm, eds., Changing the Rules:  Technological Change, 
International Competition and Regulation in Communications. The Brookings Institute, Washington, DC, 
1989, 238-245. 
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The deregulation camp offers a similarly strong yet misguided argument for 
ending government intervention in market operations, particularly in infrastructure 
segments.  Horwitz states that government regulation, as it is applied to infrastructure 
services, is effectively limited to “economic growth and the free flow of commerce.”15  
The collection of essays compiled by Foldvary and Klein extend this argument further by 
asserting that most markets no longer require government intervention.  The Half-Life of 
Policy Rationales posits that the rapid growth of new technologies in all infrastructure 
sectors has rendered invalid most cases for government intervention in industry; 
innovation generally enhances the case for free enterprise.  This hypothesis is based on 
the fact the technology has made most markets more efficient (reducing the need for 
regulation), while simultaneously making them too complex for successful intervention.16  
While these arguments hold during normal operations, things are different following a 
disaster. 
The extensive writing in opposition to government regulation has not been 
ignored by DHS.  The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace makes that point very 
clearly.  The strategy asserts that “federal regulation will not become a primary means of 
securing cyberspace.”17  No evidence is given for the validity of this choice, nor is there 
any indication of an alternative approach to convincing industry to provide a level of 
security or resilience beyond that which the overall market demands. 
Fortunately, there is a growing area of research attempting to address alternatives 
to the regulation-laissez faire dichotomy.  In Governance and Performance, Heinrich and 
Lynn compile essays from many sectors attempting to determine the impact of oversight 
structures on the overall effectiveness of public policy.  One of the themes emerging from 
this collection is that public policy implementation is rapidly moving from a hierarchical 
model of government directing industry, to a network model of collaboration and mutual 
                                                 
15 Crandall and Flamm, 87. 
16 Fred E. Foldvary and Daniel B. Klein, eds, The Half-Life of Policy Rationales:  How New 
Technology Affects Old Policy Issues, New York University Press, New York, NY, 2003. 
17 The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, 15. 
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influence.18  Stanton further links this idea of managing a network of organizations 
directly to homeland security.  He asserts that “the need to manage a nonhierarchical 
system that includes governments and private-sector organizations is especially 
pronounced in homeland security.  Coordination…is now an imperative.”19  He 
concludes that despite this recognition, this type of management is “not completely 
understood either by practitioners or by academics in the field of public 
administration.”20 
Taken as a whole, the long-running debate of how government should best 
interact with private sector infrastructure providers seems to leave public administrators 
with a palette of roles from which they could choose.  The most accommodating role is 
that of a customer, where the government simply procures a service provided in the 
manner deemed most appropriate by the provider.  The government could also perform as 
a regulator, establishing the criteria by which a provider is allowed to offer services.  
Additionally, the government could act as a coordinator, striving to guide a group of 
providers toward consensus goals on a voluntary basis.  Finally, the government could be 
an infrastructure owner/operator on its own.  In the area of critical infrastructure 
protection, the government has in fact assumed each of the roles, and perhaps chosen 
them without any evidence as to which is most applicable to a given infrastructure sector.  
This thesis will attempt to determine the impact of these alternative oversight roles on the 
effectiveness of restoration efforts in critical infrastructure sectors. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
A single case congruence approach is used to analyze recent restoration activities 
in various critical infrastructure sectors in the United States.  Cases have been chosen to 
reflect the range of roles assumed by the federal government in these sectors.  In each 
case, effectiveness of reconstitution is evaluated by the following criteria:  1) economic 
                                                 
18 Carolyn J. Heinrich and Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., eds, Governance and Performance:  New 
Perspectives, Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC, 2002, 238-291. 
19 Thomas H. Stanton, editor, Meeting the Challenge of 9/11:  Blueprints for More Effective 
Government, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., Armonk, NY, 2006, 3. 
20 Ibid., 315-316. 
 8
impacts of sector downtime; 2) time required for initial sector restoration; and 3) time 
required for full sector restoration. The cases to be examined include the 2001 Terrorist 
Attacks against the United States; the 2003 Northeast Electrical Blackout; the 2005 
response to Hurricane Katrina; and the 2006 E-coli Outbreak. 
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II. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AS AN OWNER — 
2001 AIRSPACE RESPONSE TO 9-11  
Commercial aviation contributes to our nation’s strength in many significant 
ways.  It is a key economic enabler, contributing some $900 billion per year to the 
national economy,21 which accounts for over 8% of our gross domestic product.22  
Despite an outstanding safety record, flaws in the aviation security system were exploited 
on September 11, 2001, to accomplish the worst terrorist attack in U.S. history.  This 
chapter analyzes how the unique relationship between the federal government and this 
industry contributed, both positively and negatively, to the 2001 attacks and the 
immediate response to them. While this case study deals with the passenger segment of 
commercial aviation, there are numerous security and infrastructure protection issues 
associated with the cargo segment which merit their own focused analysis. 
A. BACKGROUND 
1. Commercial Aviation 101 
Born in America, aviation has long enjoyed a special status here, evolving from 
science experiment to war machine to economic engine.  The industry includes three 
major components:  manufacturing, flight operations, and terminal operations.  Terminal 
operations include both cargo handling and passenger processing.  The industry strives to 
maintain consumer confidence in passenger aviation with a two-pronged approach 
addressing both safety and security.  The safety program focuses on ensuring that 
commercial aircraft are airworthy, that pilots and maintenance personnel are properly 
licensed and trained, and that all operations are conducted in a safe manner.  Air safety 
concerns permeate all three major components of the sector.  Security, conversely, is 
                                                 
21 Jeff Griffith, Deputy Director of Air Traffic at the Federal Aviation Administration, testimony to the 
National Commission On the Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, June 2004, http://www.9-
11commission.gov/hearings/hearing12/griffith_statement.pdf, accessed Nov. 6, 2007. 
22 Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Gross Domestic Product by Year,” U.S. Department of Commerce, 
http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp, accessed Nov. 25, 2007.  The 2001 figure of $10,128 
billion was used to calculate the percentage of GDP contributed by aviation. 
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focused at the terminal operations component.  Passenger and baggage screening were 
the predominant security measures in place at the time of the 9-11 attacks.  As the 
following section describes, the federal government was and is heavily involved in both 
the safety and security aspects of this critical infrastructure sector.23 
2. The Federal Government’s Role in Overseeing the Sector 
Aviation observers have written that, in practice, aviation security has long 
operated “as a ‘junior partner’ to safety and economic efficiency within the airlines, the 
airports, and the federal government.”24  The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
plays a dominant role in the security of commercial aviation, overseeing a multi-tiered 
architecture of security-related processes.  The FAA has two avenues for establishing 
security-related procedures for commercial aviation.  Most procedures are implemented 
via the regulatory rule-making process, which is used by many federal regulators.  The 
rule-making process is collaborative, with the air carriers and airport authorities having 
many opportunities to comment and recommend changes to proposed procedures and 
requirements.  In cases where quick implementation is necessary, the FAA has a second 
avenue, the issuance of Security Directives (SDs).  These directives are normally used to 
implement short-term requirements, which will eventually be address through the rule-
making process.  Prior to 9-11, SDs were used primarily to transmit the existing FBI no-
fly lists to air carriers.25 
Much like the food sector, the aviation sector has processes that are geared to both 
prevention and response.  The FAA itself operates the nation’s airspace management 
system, controlling the movement of all commercial aircraft.  Prior to 9-11, the FAA also 
established minimal security requirements for passenger screening accomplished by air 
carriers.  It also established in-flight procedures for dealing with hijackers, often referred 
                                                 
23 R. William Johnstone, 9/11 and the Future of Transportation Security, Praeger Security 
International, Westport, CT, 2006, 4-23. 
24 Ibid., 2. 
25 Ibid., 24-34. 
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to as “The Common Strategy.”26  Finally, local airport authorities were required to follow 
FAA requirements for physical security of airport property and facilities.27 
In addition to these relationships with the private sector, the FAA also 
coordinated with other federal agencies on aviation security.  It received intelligence 
information from various organizations, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Defense (DoD).  In addition to 
intelligence provision, DoD has standing agreements to support the FAA with alert 
aircraft for hijacking response.  The effectiveness of these relationships within the federal 
government became a major issue in the aftermath of 9-11.28  
B. ANATOMY OF AN AVIATION SECURITY BREACH 
1. Context of the 2001 Airspace Security Breach 
American aviation security was not, despite the success of the 9-11 hijackings, 
lacking for efforts to address known terrorist threats.  In fact, the security system had 
undergone a steady evolution in response to numerous security incidents around the 
world.  The rash of Cuba-bound hijackings in the U.S. during the late 1960’s started the 
changes, bringing increased focus on passenger screening for weapons as well as the 
standard in-flight highjack response of accommodation.  Other successful attacks, such as 
the Pan Am 103 bombing over Scotland, highlighted changes in terrorist tactics and did 
not go unnoticed in the U.S.  Avenues to increase the sector’s anti-sabotage capabilities 
were pursued along with the existing anti-hijacking initiatives.  
                                                 
26 “Staff Statement #4, Working Papers of the National Commission on the Terror Attacks upon the 
United States, http://www.9-11commission.gov/staff_statements/staff_statement_4.pdf, 
accessed Nov. 21, 2007.  The Common Strategy was developed by the FAA, in conjunction with the air 
carriers and federal law enforcement.  The strategy was based on the history of hijacker behaviors, which 
basically showed that planes were taken to get hostages as leverage for negotiating demands.  Aircrew 
members were trained to accommodate the hijackers, avoid confrontations, and get the plane on the ground 
as soon as possible.  No training scenarios had been developed to cover a situation where the hijackers were 
suicidal, or planned to fly the airplane themselves with the intention of using the airplane as a weapon. 
27 Johnstone, 4-23. 
28 Mike Canavan, Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security, Federal Aviation 
Administration, testimony to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, May 
23, 2003. 
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Several Congressional and Presidential commissioned studies recommended 
sweeping changes to aviation security during the 1980’s and 1990’s.  Between 1987 and 
2003, the Government Accountability Office issued some fifty reports on aviation 
security.  The common assessment was that most efforts to improve security had been 
“weak and ineffective.”  Despite strong congressional prodding and GAO flag-raising, 
the attention of the FAA and U.S. air carriers remained focused elsewhere.29  This point 
was clearly made by the director of the FAA during her 9/11 Commission testimony:  
“On September 10, we were not a nation at war…we were a nation bedeviled by delays, 
concerned about congestion, and impatient to move ahead.”30 
2. Security Breach Events and Impacts 
From the perspective of the commercial aviation sector, the 9-11 attack can best 
be examined as four simultaneous hijackings.  Given the previously described security 
structures, the timeline of the hijackings will be discussed in terms of the prevention 
failures, followed by the response actions.  The single source used for this timeline is The 
9/11 Commission Report, as this document provides a consensus account of the events 
based on an exhaustive list of primary sources.31 
The hijackers were ticketed on four transcontinental flights departing from the 
East Coast heading west.  All were processed through the security checkpoints at three 
airports, and their experiences were similar.  Ten of the nineteen were singled out for 
additional screening during the check-in process.  The only impact of this tagging was 
that their checked baggage was held until their boarding was confirmed.  At least four of 
the hijackers set off metal detectors while passing through security.  At the time of the 
attacks, procedures called for closer manual inspection to discern the cause of the alarm.  
                                                 
29 Thomas A. Birkland, Lessons of Disaster:  Policy Change after Catastrophic Events, Georgetown 
University Press, Washington, DC, 2006, 91-92.  Birkland argues that the FAA’s lack of effectiveness was 
related to the impacts of regulatory capture, which will be discussed later in this chapter. 
30 Johnstone, 2. 
31 The National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission 
Report, http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/index.htm, 1-46, accessed Nov. 6, 2007.  It 
should be noted that numerous conspiracy theorists have pointed out inconsistencies in the 9/11 
Commission’s report.  It is left to the reader to review those additional sources and determine their voracity. 
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Each of these men was individually searched, but none of their weapons were discovered.  
By 8:00 a.m., all nineteen men had defeated the existing security measures and were 
onboard their flights. 
The first hijacking commenced at approximately 8:15 a.m. aboard American 
Airlines Flight 11, which struck the North Tower of the World Trade Center at 8:46 a.m.  
At approximately 8:45 a.m., United Flight 175 was overtaken and flown into the South 
Tower at 9:03 a.m.  The takeover of American Flight 77 occurred at 8:50 a.m.; it crashed 
into the Pentagon at 9:37.  The final hijacking, United 93, began at 9:30 a.m., some 30 
minutes after the second plane struck the World Trade Center.  This flight crashed in 
eastern Pennsylvania at 10:02 after passengers, with knowledge of the first two 
hijackings, fought with the hijackers. 
The FAA Command Center in Herndon, Virginia passed word on the Flight 11 
hijacking to its headquarters’ operations center at 8:32.  The military’s Northeast Air 
Defense Sector was informed at 8:37 a.m.  Fighter aircraft were airborne at 8:53, some 7 
minutes after the first impact with the World Trade Center.  FAA Herndon was notified 
of Flight 175’s hijacked status at 9:01, just 2 minutes before it struck the South Tower.  
The military was informed of the second hijacking just after the impact.  Flight 77 flew 
undetected for 36 minutes, from 8:56 until 9:32.  At 9:25 a.m., the FAA Headquarters 
issued a nationwide ground stop, effectively closing all airspace over the continental U.S.  
The military was advised of Flight 77 at 9:36, less than 2 minutes before its impact at the 
Pentagon.  Cleveland Control Center controllers declared Flight 93 as hijacked at 9:32 
and informed the FAA Headquarters at 9:34.  At 9:42, the FAA ordered all airborne 
flights to land at the nearest airport.  The military was notified at 10:07 regarding Flight 
93, some 5 minutes after it crashed. 
A well-coordinated and well-executed attack, lasting just over two hours, resulted 
in catastrophic losses in the U.S.  Some 2,783 people lost their lives as a direct result of 
the attacks.32  All commercial air travel was suspended over the continental U.S. for four 
days.  The National Airspace System gradually reopened, with the last major airport 
                                                 
32 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Terrorism 2000-2001, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, 
DC, 2002, 10. 
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remaining closed until October 7, 2001.33  The economic impact to the commercial 
aviation industry of the 4-day closure has been estimated at $1.4 billion.34 
C. CASE ANALYSIS 
1. Overall Analysis 
The failures associated with the 9-11 attacks are well and thoroughly documented, 
as are the heroic actions of numerous individuals who distinguished themselves during 
the attacks and the immediate aftermath.  Sweeping changes have already been made, in 
both the public and private sectors, to prevent another attack and to improve response 
capabilities.  Narrowing the focus to commercial aviation and the owner/operator role 
assumed by the federal government highlights several issues that warrant further analysis.  
This section will discuss the following:  1) the FAA’s Dual Mandate; 2) impacts of 
regulatory capture; 3) cumbersome coordination between federal agencies; and 4) ability 
to close U.S. airspace. 
2. The FAA’s Dual Mandate 
Since its creation in 1958, the FAA has had as one of its missions “to establish 
security provisions which will encourage…the maximum use of the navigable 
airspace…consistent with the national security.”35  These wide-ranging responsibilities 
became known as the FAA’s Dual Mandate.  Through the years, shifting priorities given 
by the FAA to the two aspects of its mandate gave an almost “Jekyll and Hyde” character 
to the agency’s performance.  The impact of this dual mandate on aviation security can be 
seen by looking at two specific attempts to increase security in the 1990s:  The Baseline 
Working Group and the Core Commission.36 
                                                 
33 Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, History of Ronald Reagan National Airport, 
http://www.mwaa.com/_/File/_/history_DCA.pdf, accessed Nov. 19, 2007, 4. 
34 Gail Makinen, The Economic Effects of 9/11:  A Retrospective Assessment, Congressional Research 
Service, Washington, DC, 2002, 30. 
35 Johnstone, 30-31. 
36 Ibid. 
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The first bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 convinced the FAA 
leadership that the threat of foreign terrorism in the U.S. was increasing.  In 1996, the 
FAA chartered the Baseline Working Group, comprising federal officials, industry 
leaders, and public interest groups, to accomplish the following: 
review the threat assessment of foreign terrorism within the United States, 
consider the warning and interdiction capabilities of intelligence and law 
enforcement, examine the vulnerabilities of the domestic civil aviation (in 
particular checked baggage and checkpoint screening), and consider the 
consequences of a successful attack.37 
Formation of this group marked a significant departure from the agency’s long-
standing history of making security policy changes in reaction to actual events.  The 
group recommended numerous security changes, including better passenger pre-
screening, more interagency cooperation at the federal level, and increased federal 
funding of security initiatives.  These recommendations were criticized by the Office of 
Management and Budget for their “unrealistic outlook” on funding availability.  This lack 
of budget support left the FAA with no choice but to try to cajole additional security 
investments from an industry already in bad shape financially.  Further, the industry did 
not support implementation of stronger security measures if they increased customer wait 
times or screening costs.38 
TWA Flight 800 exploded off the New York coast on the day the Baseline 
Working Group began to meet.  This explosion led President Clinton to charter the White 
House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, chaired by Vice President Gore, in 
early 1997.  Using much of the Baseline Working Group’s initial work, the Gore 
Commission made similar recommendations.  One significant additional recommendation 
was the call for the FAA to develop a certification program for the passenger screening 
companies hired by the airlines.  While Congress reacted more positively to the Gore 
Commission’s call for increased federal funding in light of the recent tragedy, this  
 
                                                 
37 Johnstone, 19. 
38 Ibid., 20-21. 
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support was short-lived.  Funding for most of the recommendations was significantly 
reduced after the FAA’s final report on the TWA explosion revealed that the cause was a 
mechanical malfunction.39  
3. Impacts of Regulatory Capture 
The shifting focus of federal decision making regarding aviation security is 
further complicated by the impact of regulatory capture on the FAA.  Regulatory capture 
occurs when a regulatory agency falls under the dominant influence of the industry it is 
charged with regulating.40  Some of the decisions made by the FAA indicate it has 
succumbed to capture to the detriment of the flying public.  Two regulatory decisions 
particularly relevant to the 9-11 attacks will be described to show the impact of captured 
behavior on aviation security. 
Following the Gore Commission, the FAA proposed changes to its primary 
security regulations.  In part, these changes would have required air carriers to “detect 
and prevent” the carrying of dangerous weapons onboard an aircraft.  The air carriers’ 
largest trade organization, the Air Transport Association, submitted comments to the 
proposed rule change, suggesting that “detect” be changed to “deter.”  The rationale of 
this suggestion was that detection had the connotation of 100% success, and the carriers 
felt that standard was unattainable.  The FAA agreed and implemented the change.  Later, 
in testimony to the 9-11 Commission, air carrier representatives were asked about their 
failure to detect the weapons used by the hijackers.  Their response was that the rules 
only required them to deter weapons, not detect them.41 
The air carriers were also successful in convincing the FAA to ignore the most 
forward-looking recommendations of the Baseline Working Group.  As stated before, this 
group’s work broke the FAA’s long-standing history of reactive policy making, a move 
that was championed by many security advocates.  The air carriers, however, argued that 
                                                 
39 Johnstone, 21-26. 
40 George L. Priest, “Origins of Utility Regulation” Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 36, no. 1, 
April 1993, 289-323. 
41 Johnstone, 27-28. 
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the absence of increasing domestic security incidents indicated that there was no reason 
to change the existing system.  Their argument was based on the successful aviation 
safety program, in which policy changes are based on empirical evidence indicating areas 
in need of improvement.  The FAA again backed down, and stopped pushing for its most 
comprehensive working group recommendations.42 
Finally, the systematic reducing of fines for rule violations by the FAA provides a 
textbook example of regulatory capture.  In her 9-11 commission testimony, former 
Department of Transportation Inspector General Mary Shiavo reported that her office had 
investigated the issue of fine reduction, and the results were troubling.  In most cases, the 
investigators found that fines were reduced by approximately 90%, basically eliminating 
the penalty.  Schiavo testified that “…you had a lot of tough talk…and then down the 
pike…when all the attention went away, the result was about ten cents on the dollar.”43  
4. Cumbersome Coordination between Federal Agencies 
Perhaps the most discussed failure related to the 9-11 attacks is the failure of 
various federal agencies to coordinate on national security issues.  Two areas that have 
drawn particular attention will be described here as examples.  One relates to information 
sharing and the other to requesting assistance from other federal agencies. 
On September 11, 2001, the FAA maintained its own no-fly list which was 
circulated to the air carriers via an FAA Security Directive.  At the time of the attacks, 
this list contained just twelve names.  Contrast this with the FBI terror watchlist, which 
contained over 40,000 names of known and suspected terrorists.  Another list, the State 
Department’s terror watchlist, was made available to the FAA prior to 9-11.  This list, 
containing some 60,000 names, was reviewed by the FAA and declared “too difficult to 
use.”44  
                                                 
42 Johnstone, 37-43. 
43 Mary Schiavo, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Transportation, testimony to the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, May 23, 2003, 86-87, http://www.9-
11commission.gov/archive/hearing2/9-11Commission_Hearing_2003-05-23.pdf, accessed 
Nov. 8, 2007. 
44 9-11 Commission Report, 83-84. 
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The FAA and DoD had written procedures for responding to a domestic hijacking 
event.  The DoD did not monitor domestic airspace, though it had the mission of 
defending U.S. airspace.  At the time of the attacks, all DoD surveillance radars were on 
the coasts of the country, and watching outwards.45  If the FAA required DoD assistance, 
a formal request had to be sent from the FAA Operations Center, through the National 
Military Command Center, to the Secretary of Defense. During the 9-11 attacks, 
numerous contacts were made between various FAA regional control centers and closely 
located military installations.  None of these contacts were sufficient to gain a military 
response, per existing protocols.  As noted in the earlier sections, though the FAA and 
DoD were communicating, information was slow to be passed, with most notifications 
occurring several layers down in the chain of command.  The Secretary of Defense was 
only notified after Flight 77 had already struck the Pentagon.46 
5. Ability to Close U.S. Airspace 
One response action taken by the FAA during the 9-11 attacks has been widely 
praised.  After the fourth hijacking was confirmed, the FAA issued a nationwide ground 
stop, which essentially closed the airspace over the continent U.S.  This action had never 
been executed before, and by all accounts, was handled extremely well.  Nearly 4,500 
unplanned landings were accomplished in just over two and a half hours, all without 
incident.47  At the time the order was issued, there was no way to be sure how many 
additional hijackings were in progressed or planned for that day.  The ability for the FAA 
to clear the entire U.S. airspace in less than three hours shows one of the positive aspects 
of federal ownership and operation of a sector of our critical infrastructure. 
                                                 
45 Larry Arnold, Major General, USAF, Commander of the U.S. Air Force’s 1st Air Force, testimony 
to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, May 23, 2003, http://www.9-
11commission.gov/archive/hearing2/9-11Commission_Hearing_2003-05-23.pdf, 28-29, 
accessed Nov. 8, 2007. 
46 Ibid., 19-22. 
47 See Griffith Testimony, note 21. 
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6. Analysis Summary 
The federal response to the 9-11 hijackings showed both the positive and negative 
attributes of government’s practical ownership in this sector.  The FAA’s dual mandate to 
both regulate and promote commercial aviation caused known security flaws to fall 
behind more visible priorities.  These questionable priorities were also evident in the 
regulatory decisions made prior to the attacks, as costs and customer wait times won out 
over security.  Despite these shortcomings, the FAA’s ability to close the airspace over 
the U.S. in a matter of hours would have likely been lost if coordination among multiple 
decision makers would have been required.  In total, the ownership role had more 
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III. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AS A CUSTOMER — 2003 
NORTHEAST BLACKOUT  
A. BACKGROUND 
In our modern society, few things if any impact our lives more than electricity.  
Most people take for granted that all the electricity they need will somehow be at their 
disposal, at just the time they need it.  In the summer of 2003, millions of customers 
throughout the northeastern U.S. discovered just how precarious the electricity supply 
was as an untrimmed tree branch, accompanied by malfunctioning computer systems, 
caused one of the worst blackouts in U.S. history.  The chapter analyzes how the 
circumstances surrounding this outage were enabled by the relationship between the 
federal government and the electricity industry. 
1. Electricity 101 
Electricity is ubiquitous.  This never-ending stream of power is produced by what 
has been dubbed “the largest machine ever built.”48  The power grid comprises three 
distinct infrastructure components:  generation, transmission, and distribution.  Vast 
amounts of raw electricity are moved closer to the end customer via the high-voltage 
transmission system.  Throughout the transmission system, substations are strategically 
placed to route power to local customers via the distribution system.49 
The defining characteristic of the power grid is the level of interdependence 
among the grid components.  Each generation, transmission, and distribution component 
is designed to handle a certain load.  Suboptimal loads (either high or low) are disruptive 
to the grid, to the point of causing physical damage to the individual components.  This 
interdependence requires a remarkable level of minute-by-minute monitoring and flow 
control.  Generators must respond to demand changes while the transmission system 
                                                 
48 Philip E. Auerswald, Lewis M. Branscomb, Todd M. LaPorte, Erwann O. Michel-Kerjan, eds., 
Seeds of Disaster, Roots of Response:  How Private Action Can Reduce Public Vulnerability, Cambridge 
University Press, New York, NY, 2006, 164. 
49 Ibid., 194-197. 
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adjusts to varying system loads.  Bulk power must be constantly rerouted around 
transmission outages.  This coordination mechanism, spanning 250,000 miles of 
transmission lines and 65,000 substations, must function literally at the speed of light, 
making automated control systems absolutely essential.50 
2. The Federal Government’s Role in Overseeing the Grid51 
The growth of the electricity industry supported the rapid industrialization of 
America in the early twentieth century.  Power was often generated in or near urban 
industrial centers, minimizing the role of the transmission system.  As environmental and 
safety concerns began to push power generation into less populated areas, the need for a 
robust transmission capability increased.  Vertically integrated organizations dominated 
the industry for most of the twentieth century, providing all three components of the 
power grid.  The Federal Power Commission, followed by its successor the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission, provided federal oversight of this industry, focusing 
mostly on prevention of price gouging. 
Major blackouts in the 1960s spurred the Congress to propose legislation forcing 
stronger federal regulation of the power grid.  In response, the industry formed the North 
American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), its charter being to develop and 
enforce operating standards on its members.  This move convinced the Congress that 
additional federal regulation was not needed.  NERC proceeded to develop standards 
which were voluntary for its members to follow; NERC had no legal authority to enforce 





                                                 
50 Auerswald, 198-201.  The level of coordination required to support the grid cannot be overstated.  
Power production is dispatched to meet constantly fluctuating demand on an hourly basis, then fine-tuned 
throughout the hour.  All of this happens across transmission areas covering multiple states. 
51 Stan Johnson, Manager of Situation Awareness and Infrastructure Security, North American 
Electric Reliability Corporation, interviewed by the author on 23 August, 2007.  Unless specifically cited 
otherwise, all information in this section is adapted from this interview. 
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the 1980s, which resulted in the breakup of the vertically integrated grid operators.  This 
resulted in even less control of a critical infrastructure which demands oversight by its 
highly interdependent design.52 
NERC’s mission expanded in the late 1990s to include critical infrastructure 
protection.  NERC operates the electricity sector’s Information Sharing and Analysis 
Center, a forum for crosstalk among the private sector power producers and between the 
sector and the federal government.53  By supporting this voluntary self-regulation, the 
federal government in effect became a customer of the industry’s infrastructure 
restoration processes. 
B. ANATOMY OF A BLACKOUT 54 
1. Context of the 2003 Northeast Blackout 
The subject blackout occurred in the largest of North America’s power sector, the 
Eastern Interconnection.  This sector encompasses the eastern two-thirds of the United 
States and portions of southeast Canada.  Responsibility for grid reliability in the 
blackout area was shared by three regional reliability councils, under the oversight of 
NERC.  Additionally, there were five control areas directly impacted by the blackout.  
Control area operators are directly responsible for the daily operations of the grid 
components within their areas. 
NERC and its member organizations operate the power grid according to the “N-1 
Criteria.”  This structure requires that the grid be able to remain stable during the worst 
single contingency for 30 minutes.  During this 30-minute period, control area operators 
must restore the grid to its pre-contingency state or make adjustments to all components  
                                                 
52 Additional information on the history of NERC can be obtained at its website, 
http://www.nerc.com, accessed Oct. 3, 2007. 
53 National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 51-69.  The referenced section of the NIPP explains the 
various information sharing forums put in place by DSH.  The Information Sharing and Analysis Center is 
the primary structure for private sector companies to share proprietary information on threats and in-place 
protection measures. 
54 U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, Final Report on the August 14, 2003 Blackout in 
the United States and Canada:  Causes and Recommendations, North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation, Princeton, NJ, 2004, 5-12. 
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to prepare for the worst next contingency (the N-2 event).  These preparations require 
both real-time awareness of grid components and detailed coordination with neighboring 
control areas. 
2. Blackout Events and Impacts55 
Customer demands for electricity on August 14, 2003 were high but well within 
the normal operating ranges of the power system.  At approximately 10:00 am, grid 
operators in Ohio began experiencing glitches with their computer control systems.  This 
limited the situational awareness of the grid status in Ohio, leaving controllers unaware of 
failures in key transmission lines in their sectors.  These unknown outages became 
critical as the afternoon heat began to increase the demand for electricity.  Ohio operators 
began to increase generation to meet the demand, and automatic systems kicked in to 
import power from neighboring control areas. 
As additional power poured into Ohio, the transmission system continued to 
crumble.  The status displays from the degraded monitoring systems left controllers 
unable to reconcile field reports of local outages and dangerous loading indicators from 
power generators.  By approximately 4:00 pm, the high-voltage transmission system 
across the eastern interconnection had reached a critical state.  Finally, the failure of a 
key line in eastern Ohio began an unstoppable cascading failure.  Automatic equipment 
protection mechanisms began to kick in across the region, tripping transmission circuits 
and shutting down generators.  Within 10 minutes the outage spread from Ohio to the 
East Coast, and north into Canada, affecting some 50 million people. 
The August 2003 blackout goes down as one of the worst ever in North America.  
Cost estimates of the impact vary, with the generally accepted amount at $6 Billion.56  
The grid was restored for limited operations in 26 hours, with full restoration requiring 96 
                                                 
55 Final Report on the August 14, 2003 Blackout, 23-93.  This blackout was remarkable in its technical 
complexity.  The following paragraphs provide a cursory description at best.  Readers interested in the 
detailed explanations should consult the full report. 
56 Ibid., 1.  Other estimates are summarized in the following:  Electricity Consumers Resource 
Council, The Economic Impacts of the August 2003 Blackout, 2004, 
http://www.elcon.org/Documents/EconomicImpactsOfAugust2003Blackout.pdf, accessed 
Oct. 2, 2007. 
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hours.  The following analysis will describe how the federal government’s assuming the 
customer role affected the time necessary for restoration of power and the cost associated 
with this outage. 
C. CASE ANALYSIS 
1. Overall Analysis 
The federal government’s limited oversight role contributed to the duration and 
cost of the 2003 Blackout.  NERC has cited four main causes of the outage:  1) failure of 
the Ohio reliability coordinator to plan enough reactive power for August 14; 2) loss of 
situational awareness on critical sections of the grid; 3) failure to manage vegetation 
growth in power line rights-of-way; and 4) failure of the regional reliability coordinators 
to provide real-time diagnostic support.57  Though little could be done to speed recovery 
or lessen the financial impacts of the blackout once it occurred, it is clear that the scope 
of the blackout could have been reduced with stronger oversight at the federal level.    
Three specific issues will be discussed here: guideline development, compliance 
evaluation, and federal regulatory focus on issues other than reliability. 
2. Guideline Development 
As a customer, the federal government allowed the electricity industry to develop 
its own operational guidelines.58  Some of these guidelines proved to be insufficient, 
either directly contributing to the blackout or allowing it to grow in scope.  The following 
areas will covered specifically in this analysis:  1) lack of guidelines requiring validation 
of computerized control and monitoring systems; 2) lack of guidelines for operator 
training and certification; and 3) lack of guidelines for information sharing among 
reliability coordinators. 
                                                 
57 Final Report on the August 14, 2003 Blackout, 18-19. 
58 Per the Johnson interview, NERC develops standards using American National Standards Institute 
processes.  The standards are then reviewed by and voted on by the members of NERC.  A full description 
of the process is available at http://www.nerc.com, accessed Oct. 2, 2007. 
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a. Guidelines Requiring Validation of Computerized Control and 
Monitoring Systems 
The complexity and interconnectedness of the power grid combine to 
present a unique and complicated management challenge.  Control area operators require 
sophisticated automated tools to provide real-time awareness of the grid’s status and to 
assist with look-ahead planning for grid adjustments.  The systems in place during the 
2003 Blackout failed in both regards. 
The Reliability Coordinator for Ohio repeatedly lost situational awareness 
of their control area on August 14.  The monitoring and control system had been recently 
upgraded, and operators were continuing to find and diagnose system errors while using 
the system operationally.  NERC’s final investigative report states that the system 
provided outdated status information for several hours leading up to the blackout.59  
Additional errors were cited in the estimation tools used by other reliability 
organizations.  The erroneous data produced by these estimation tools, themselves caused 
by poor system status information, prevented operators from making adjustments that 
could have limited the cascade of blackout conditions.  While computer software glitches 
are unavoidable, allowing untested systems to be used in this demanding environment is 
risky management as best.  Guidelines requiring documented validation of computer 
system testing and performance prior to implementation could have prevented one of the 
blackout’s significant contributing factors.  Other critical infrastructure sectors, such as 
finance, have adopted verification procedures for the communications systems used by 
their members.60  These guidelines are part of the mandatory business continuity plans 
required in this sector.61 
                                                 
59 Final Report on the August 14, 2003 Blackout, 45-50. 
60 Financial Services Sector Coordinating Council, Financial Services Sector 2006 Annual Report, 
https://www.fsscc.org/reports/2006/annual_report_2006.pdf, 128-131, Washington, DC, 
accessed Nov. 21, 2007. 
61 Lee Wrobel, “Legal Requirements for Disaster Recovery Planning:  Common Facts and 
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b. Guidelines for Operator Training and Certification 
In addition to these technical issues, NERC documented numerous 
instances where operators and technicians had not been trained on existing guidelines and 
procedures.  Operators did not follow established procedures for updating neighboring 
control areas on existing contingency scenarios.  Since control area operators do not have 
visibility into upstream or downstream areas, they require inputs from other operators 
regarding the status of their grid.  In this case, existing guidelines were sufficient, but 
operators were not trained on them.  The federal government could address this shortfall 
be requiring control area operators obtain certification on grid operation and restoration 
procedures. 
c. Guidelines for Information Sharing Between Reliability 
Coordinators 
Given the inextricable linkages between the various components of the 
power grid, it seems unacceptably risky that sharing operational status and planning 
information is left to the discretion of the control area operators.  This restricted 
information flow is further complicated by the inability of neighboring control areas to 
get any visibility of the overall grid status electronically; operators are limited to 
observing status of their own sectors.  Since planning systems in each sector depend on 
the ability to import power from neighboring sectors, the isolated character of the grid’s 
management systems is self-defeating. 
This lack of information sharing directly contributed to Cause #4 noted 
above.  The reliability coordinator for Ohio was unable to bring their significant analysis 
capabilities to bear on the growing problems on the grid in their control area due to the 
lack of visibility of the grid’s status.  By the time each player in the affected grid sectors 
gathered the available and relevant information, the conditions for an unstoppable 
cascading outage were already present.  Any actions taken at that point were too little, too 
late. 
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3. Compliance Evaluation 
The previous section describes several instances in which existing industry-
developed guidelines were insufficient to address the causes of the 2003 Blackout.  
Unfortunately, even if these guidelines were in place, NERC had neither the processes in 
place to verify compliance with them, nor the authority to enforce them.  Two of the four 
cited causes of this blackout were direct violations of existing guidelines:  1) failure to 
plan for adequate reactive power to maintain the grid within N-1 standards; and 3) failure 
to follow guidelines for vegetation management in power line rights-of-way. 
Both NERC and FERC seemed comfortable with the federal government’s 
assumption of the customer role.  Perhaps the 99.8% availability rate of the grid 
convinced both sides that more oversight was unnecessary.  It is also clear that more 
heavy-handed regulation from the federal government was not politically enticing to 
DHS.62  Unfortunately, the lax compliance regime that emerged from this relationship 
directly contributed to the 2003 Blackout. 
4. Regulatory Focus on Issues Other Than Reliability 
The final contributory effect of the government’s customer role was the FERC’s 
limited regulatory focus on infrastructure restoration and reliability.  Keeping rates at a 
minimum was, and remains, FERC’s overriding goal.  The Commission’s website states 
its core responsibility is “to guard the consumer from exploitation by non-competitive 
power companies.”63  When regulatory decisions were driven by this rate-conscious 
mindset, NERC had little chance of cajoling its members to impact their bottom lines 
with investments in reliability.  Two of the blackout’s main causes (poor operational 
planning and loss of situational awareness) reflected management decisions by the Ohio 
grid operator based on cost reduction, not reliability.  Training operators to detect subtle 
anomalies in the grid and react in a manner timely enough to avert disaster is expensive.  
Additionally, fielding a critical control system without adequate testing and verification is 
                                                 
62 National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, 17. 
63 FERC website, http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/competition.asp, 
accessed Oct. 11, 2007. 
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another cost-saving decision with disastrous results.  In an environment where cost 
containment is the major focus, neither of these decisions is surprising.64  
Beyond these direct impacts, rate restrictions have had other unintended 
consequences.  First, the push to lower end-customer costs forces providers to buy bulk 
power from the lowest-cost producers.  Often, these producers are not located in close 
proximity to the local power provider.  This forces more power onto an already saturated 
transmission system.  Additionally, as rate constraints tend to restrict investment, each 
provider’s daily planning often depends on importing power from neighboring control 
areas to meet contingency demands.  When the transmission system fails, as it did in 
2003, importing power to meet demand is not possible, and even contributes to the 
cascading nature of this outage.65 
5. Analysis Summary 
The customer role assumed by the federal government in overseeing the reliability 
of the power grid has worked well.  The industry has responded by developing an 
extensive set of operating guidelines, the results of which have been quite remarkable in 
terms of power availability.  The events in August 2003 exposed the missing component 
of this relationship:  a requirement for mandatory compliance with the operating 
guidelines.  This lack of enforceability allowed the two direct causes of the blackout to 
exist, and resulted in the largest blackout in U.S. history. 
                                                 
64 Final Report on the August 14, 2003 Blackout, 107.  In this reference, NERC asserts that poor 
vegetation management has contributed to major major power outages.  Together with note 65 and the 
overall tone of the NERC report, the author infers that cost-consciousness was a major factor in the 
decision making process. 
65 Ibid., 103-104.  Table 7.1 in the NERC report summarizes a list of nine factors which present 
looming challenges to the U.S. power grid.  Four of the nine issues are related to reduced operating margins 
on the high-voltage transmission systems, due both to increase load and reduced investment.  NERC states 
specifically that companies are “less willing to make investments in transmission reliability that do not 
increase revenues.” 
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IV. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AS A COORDINATOR —  
2005 COMMUNICATIONS RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA  
Hurricane Katrina was one of the most destructive natural disasters in the history 
of the United States.  Literally every sector of the Gulf Coast Region’s infrastructure was 
severely damaged; the telecommunications sector was especially hard hit.  A thorough 
review of each sector’s restoration activities would be impossible to do in a limited case 
study.  This chapter will focus exclusively on the telecommunications infrastructure, the 
damage it sustained, and the role of federal government played in coordinating its 
restoration.  Economic impacts and restoration timelines will be adjusted to reflect a 
similarly limited view of this disaster. 
A. BACKGROUND 
1. Commercial Telecommunications 101 
The telecommunications backbone, along with the nation’s power grid, comprises 
a set of underlying infrastructure that enables most of our modern culture and economy to 
function.  The bundle of networks and equipment making up the backbone is often called 
cyberspace.  A cursory understanding of cyberspace will allow the reader to appreciate 
how complex a management challenge it presents.  Cyberspace is best understood by 
briefly examining its physical and logical characteristics. 
The cyberspace backbone is physically constructed of high-capacity fiber optic 
cables, connected by the necessary switching equipment to facilitate accurate flow of data 
packets.  The modern cyberspace backbone has become increasingly convergent, 
meaning that it carries data packets of many types, ranging from computer network traffic 
to voice telephone calls to television programming.  More recently, technology advances 
have allowed wireless backbone segments to be implemented in areas where high-speed 
cabling is not available.  While this convergent network is economically efficient, it also 
increases the likelihood that any significant disruption of the backbone will impact 
numerous if not all methods of electronic communications. 
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Customer access to the cyberspace backbone is provided by what the industry 
calls “the last mile.”  This connection is provided in a variety of ways, from high-speed 
cable, to Digital Subscriber Line (DSL), to regular telephone wiring, to wireless 
connections.  In fact, convergence has reached the end user as well, with many homes 
receiving their telephone, computer network, and television access via a single 
connection.  Clearly, both the backbone and customer access connections must be 
functional to allow these capabilities to be used as needed. 
This extensive web of backbone and end user connectivity would be useless 
without the logical processes and protocols that allow packet transmission.  As one might 
imagine, this transmission requires a high degree of standardization among the many 
companies that provide cyber services.  The industry is mostly self-governed in this 
regard, with standards being determined by consensus among the largest service 
providers and user communities.  Users hardly think twice about calling another person, 
sending an email, or browsing a website.  Any of these activities likely involves many 
different service providers, all of which exchange packets of different types and get them 
to their proper destinations.66 
2. The Federal Government’s Role in Overseeing the Sector 
Oversight of the telecommunications sector is divided between the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) and the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS).67   The FCC, as the primary regulatory agency for this sector, has a broad mission 
to oversee the day-to-day operations, with its responsibilities including “regulating 
interstate and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite and 
cable.”68  For issues related to critical infrastructure protection and disaster response, the  
 
 
                                                 
66 This description is based on the author’s professional experience. 
67 National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 3. 
68 Federal Communications Commission website, http://www.fcc.gov/aboutus.html, accessed Nov. 19, 
2007. 
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FCC has created the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau.  This bureau 
consolidated functions which, at the time of Hurricane Katrina, were accomplished by 
various entities within the FCC.69 
The FCC has realized that the complexities of modern telecommunications 
industry require cooperation between the major providers, as well as between the industry 
and the federal government.  To facilitate this cooperation, the Commission chartered the 
Network Reliability and Interoperability Council (NRIC).  NRIC was originally formed 
in 1992 to address a series of prolonged outages in the telephone switching infrastructure.  
Since that time, the FCC has repeatedly rechartered NRIC to address various issues such 
as the Year 2000 problem, and most recently critical infrastructure protection.  NRIC 
comprises CEO-level representatives from some 35 communications providers, and 
forms focus groups to tackle each problem area referred to it by the FCC.  The guidelines 
and best practices published by the NRIC are not mandatory and are not enforced by the 
FCC.70 
The National Infrastructure Protection Plan gave DHS responsibility for the 
telecommunications sector with regard to critical infrastructure protection.71  During a 
disaster, the FCC works within the overall federal response structure, in accordance with 
the National Response Plan.  Cyberspace infrastructure issues requiring federal assistance 
are addressed through two separate channels during a disaster.  The first of these channels 
involves national security communications.  Any issues regarding critical federal 
government communications are addressed by the National Communications System 
through its National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications (NCC).  The FCC 
provides direct support to the NCC.  The FCC typically establishes the second 
coordination channel by placing personnel within the Joint Field Office directing the 
federal disaster response.  Requests for FCC support dealing with local infrastructure  
 
                                                 
69 Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, website, http://www.fcc.gov/pshs/, accessed 
Nov. 19, 2007. 
70 Network Reliability and Interoperability Council website, http://www.nric.org, accessed 
Nov. 19, 2007. 
71 National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 3. 
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restoration are addressed via this channel.  Since many of the commercial providers 
support both national and local communications infrastructures, many of these requests 
are processed through the NCC as well.72 
B. ANATOMY OF A TELECOMMUNICATIONS OUTAGE 
1. Context of Hurricane Katrina’s Telecommunications Impacts 
As the previous section describes, federal oversight of the telecommunications 
sector is fragmented.  The fragmentation is evident when reviewing the results of the 
various coordinating bodies involved in this sector.  In short, the overwhelming focus of 
DHS oversight has been on improving cyber security within the sector,73 whereas the 
FCC efforts have been aimed at building processes for resilience into the day-to-day 
operations of the commercial providers.74  While the two-pronged approach does not 
preclude successful oversight, it does present a requirement for coordination at the 
federal level which was not in place during the response to Katrina.  Many DHS 
initiatives had yet to be supported with the detailed planning necessary to implement 
them when Katrina struck.75  It is against this backdrop of uncoordinated oversight that 
Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath unfolded. 
                                                 
72 Kenneth P. Moran, Director of Office of Homeland Security, Federal Communications 
Commission, testimony to the Hearing on Hurricane Katrina and Communications Interoperability, U.S. 
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Sept. 29, 2005, 5-7. 
73 Government Accountability Office, Internet Infrastructure:  DHS Faces Challenges in Developing 
a Joint Public/Private Recovery Plan, Government Accountability Office, Washington, DC, June 2006, 18-
21. 
74 Mission statement of the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, 
http://www.fcc.gov/pshs/, accessed Nov. 20, 2007. 
75 GAO, DHS Faces Challenges in Developing a Joint Public/Private Recovery Plan, 29-30. 
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2. Telecommunications Infrastructure Events and Impacts76 
“Katrina” quietly entered the U.S. consciousness as Tropical Depression 12 on 
August 23, 2005.  It was officially named “Tropical Storm Katrina” the following day, as 
it strengthened and moved toward the U.S.  The federal government’s disaster response 
machine also began to move on the August 24, with FEMA deploying its advance 
preparation unit, the Hurricane Liaison Team.  FEMA also put its Gulf Coast Region on 
alert in case backup support was needed for the forecast Florida landfall.  Katrina came 
ashore on Florida’s eastern coast at approximately 6:30 pm local time. 
Many hurricanes that cross southern Florida and enter the Gulf of Mexico make a 
second landfall along the Gulf Coast; Katrina followed this traditional path.  The National 
Hurricane Center predicted on August 26 that Katrina would again make landfall, this 
time as a Category 4 storm.  Both Mississippi and Louisiana declared states of emergency 
that day, which fully energized each state’s disaster management organizations.  FEMA 
continued its daily planning teleconferences, which had begun some two days earlier, to 
coordinate federal staging activities.  August 27 saw the beginning of mandatory 
evacuations from the most dangerous sections of Louisiana and Mississippi; evacuation 
orders continued into the following day.  FEMA continued to mobilize its management, 
logistics, and medical teams from the nearby regional centers.  Late on August 27, 
President Bush issued federal emergency declarations for Mississippi, Alabama, and 
Louisiana, authorizing federal expenditures to help meet state requirements. 
By late afternoon on August 28, Katrina’s winds were beginning to affect 
evacuation operations, and shelters in the area were beginning to fill.  Last minute 
increases to water and food stockpiles were made before rain and wind curtailed most 
preparatory operations.  Katrina made landfall at 6:10 am on August 29 as a Category 3 
storm.  By noon that day, reports of levee failures throughout New Orleans began to 
reach officials.  Within a day’s time, 80% of the city was flooded. 
                                                 
76 Katrina Lessons Learned Staff, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina:  Lessons Learned, 
Office of the President of the United States, February 2006, 1-50.  Most of this section is based on this 
report.  Data from other sources will be specifically cited.  The reader should also note that data specific to 
the timelines of telecommunications infrastructure failure and restoration is not readily available. 
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The overall impact of Katrina on the Gulf Coast was remarkable.  It was the most 
destructive natural disaster in U.S. history, and the most deadly one since 1920.  Isolating 
the impacts on the telecommunications sector is difficult, but some sector-specific 
information is available.  The two largest commercial providers in the area, Sprint and 
BellSouth, reported their infrastructure repair costs would total between $600 and $800 
million.77  Some three million customers were without telephone service, with some 80% 
restored within 10 days of Katrina’s landfall.78  Some areas of New Orleans are still 
without full telecommunications services today.79 
 C. CASE ANALYSIS 
1. Overall Analysis 
The shortfalls in the federal response to Hurricane Katrina are well documented 
and have been discussed at length in many forums.  As noted above, specific timelines 
for restoration activities for specific infrastructures are lacking.  This does not, however, 
preclude the identification of some general positive and negative contributions of the 
coordination role assumed by the federal government in the telecommunications sector.  
This analysis will address the following areas:  1) coordination of regulatory waiver 
requests; and 2) coordination of restoration requirements. 
2. Coordination of Regulation Waiver Requests 
In addition to the technical complexities for successful infrastructure sharing 
described earlier, the FCC has numerous regulatory requirements governing access to the 
telecommunications backbone networks.  To facilitate rapid restoration of infrastructure 
affected by Katrina, the FCC waived numerous regulatory requirements.  According to 
the FCC’s Director of Homeland Security, some 190 requests were received in the first 
                                                 
77 Roseanne Gerin, “Telecoms Ride to the Rescue:  Carriers Turn Out in Force to Aid Katrina 
Recovery Effort,” Washington Technology, Vol. 20, No. 19, Sept. 2005, 1. 
78 GAO, DHS Faces Challenges in Developing a Joint Public/Private Recovery Plan, 26. 
79 Marlys Harris, “You Can’t Go Home Again,” Money Magazine, August 2007, 
http://money.cnn.com/2007/08/01/pf/neworleans_pellissier.moneymag/index.htm, accessed 
Nov. 21, 2007. 
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14 days of the restoration.  The vast majority of the requests were approved within four 
hours, with none taking longer than 24 hours.  These requests varied from applications 
for temporary radio frequencies to suspension of equal access requirements.  Many of 
these requests, particularly those involving radio or satellite frequencies, required 
coordination with other customers to avoid interference.80  For illustration, two requests 
will be detailed below. 
FCC requirements basically require backbone providers to allow equal access to 
their networks to all other providers at fair rates.  While these rates are not controlled by 
the FCC, providers may not use discriminatory pricing to give unfair advantage to a 
particular vendor, including its own subsidiaries which may provide local services in an 
area.  BellSouth requested special authorization to re-route traffic from its subsidiary, 
BellSouth Long Distance, over the unaffected portions of its regional network.  
Normally, this would not have been allowed since it gives the subsidiary an unfair 
competitive advantage.81 
Another familiar FCC regulation prohibits an activity known as slamming, where 
a local telephone provider switches a customer’s long distance carrier without explicit 
permission from the customer.  This normally subjects the customer to transfer fees and 
perhaps even higher charges.  In many instances following Katrina, vendors requested 
relief from this requirement to facilitate restoration; the FCC readily approved these 
requests.82 
These waivers positively affected the restoration in two ways.  First, waivers for 
discriminatory access to backbone networks normally take months to adjudicate.83  The 
speed with which the FCC responded shortened the restoration time by weeks.  
                                                 
80 Moran, 5. 
81 Federal Communications Commission, “Joint Application by BellSouth Corporation, BellSouth 
Telecommunications, Inc., and BellSouth Long Distance, Inc., for Provision of In-Region, Inter-LATA 
Services in Georgia and Louisiana,” Federal Communications Commission, Washington, DC, Sept. 13, 
2005, 1-3. 
82 Moran, Appendix A. 
83 Ibid. 
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Additionally, allowing the use of existing networks saved the vendors the additional 
expense of installing more temporary networks to facilitate their restoration efforts. 
3. Coordination of Restoration Requirements 
The FCC also assumed responsibility for coordinating the requirement of 
telecommunications sector responders with other sectors.  Two examples will show the 
positive impacts of this coordination on the restoration efforts.  First, security became a 
major issue for all responders.  As the conditions in New Orleans worsened, many 
workers came under attack while attempting to accomplish their work.  Federal and local 
authorities began to provide security details for repair teams to enable their work to 
continue.  The FCC coordinated the schedules of telecommunications repair teams with 
other sectors to maximize the efficient use of security assets.84 
The FCC also served as a conduit of telecommunications requirements between 
federal and local officials.  Service providers would apprise the FCC of the services they 
were capable of offering, and the FCC would present these capabilities to response 
coordinators.  For example, post-landfall evacuations were struggling to gain traction due 
to the inability to broadcast pickup locations to the population.  The FCC was able to put 
providers with portable broadcast systems in contact with local officials, as well as 
expedite any regulatory relief necessary for these broadcasts.85 
 As one might expect, there were instances where the coordination could have 
been better.  Two examples will make this point clear.  As the aforementioned security 
situation worsened, local and military officials began to restrict access to the damaged 
areas.  Many officials were not accepting identification credentials produced by the 
telecommunications vendors as valid for access.  This was further complicated by the 
inability of federal officials to let responders know what types of credentials would be 
acceptable.86  In addition to access issues, coordination across the sector response teams 
                                                 
84 Moran, 4-7. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission, Independent Panel 
Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks, June 2006, 14-19. 
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was lacking in regards to supplies needed for restoration.  For example, many 
telecommunications providers contracted for their own fuel deliveries to keep their 
backup generators operational.  During the deliveries, fuel trucks were often diverted to 
higher-priority requirements, such as rescue vehicle fuel supplies.  As generator fuel 
supplies ran short, communications disruptions would occur and further hamper relief 
efforts.  This confusion over requirement prioritization tended to slow restoration and 
frustrated the participants on both sides.87 
4. Analysis Summary 
As these brief examples show, the role of coordinator in the telecommunications 
sectors was thoroughly tested in the response to Hurricane Katrina.  There were 
successes, such as coordination of regulatory relief and repair schedule coordination 
across infrastructure sectors.  There were, however, areas where coordination was 
lacking, particularly in repair supply delivery and in controlling access to the disaster 
areas.  Overall, properly executed coordination had a positive impact on the restoration 
activities. 
 
                                                 
87 Report and Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission, Independent Panel 
Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks, June 2006, 14-19. 
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V. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AS A REGULATOR —  
2006 E. COLI OUTBREAK  
A. BACKGROUND 
In the summer of 2006, American’s were given the rare occasion to question the 
safety of their food supply.  Fresh spinach, grown in California, was linked to an outbreak 
of E. coli spread across the country.  A joint state and federal investigation would soon 
reveal lapses on the part of growers and processors, and even on the part of the federal 
regulators charged with overseeing this vital sector of the U.S. economy. 
1. Food Production 101 
America has long been called the breadbasket of the world.  Over the nearly three 
centuries of our nation’s history, agriculture has grown from a means of family 
sustenance to a multibillion dollar per year industry.   In Fiscal Year 2006, agriculture 
contributed some 1% of the nation’s Gross Domestic Product.  In addition to supporting 
domestic consumption, U.S. agricultural exports in FY 2006 were nearly $69 billion.88  
This critical infrastructure sector comprises a complex network of growers, harvesters, 
processors, retailers, and supporting trade organizations linking domestic and 
international consumers to farmers. 
This case study deals only with the fresh produce segment of the food sector, 
which itself constitutes a rather complex structure making oversight and food safety 
challenging to say the least.  In most regions, each player in the process (land owners, 
growers, harvesters and processors) are separate commercial entities.  Most packaged 
products will likely contain produce from different growers within the same package.  
Safety of this critical food sector is managed via a process called Hazard Assessment and 
Critical Control Points (HACCP).  Using this process, each entity in the flow assesses 
points at which hazards could endanger food safety.  These hazard entry points are then 
                                                 
88 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Outlook for U.S. Agricultural Trade, U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, Washington, DC, Aug. 2007, 1-4. 
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tightly managed with Critical Control Points, most of which entail manual inspection or 
preventive measures such as product washing, safe handling practices, or utensil 
sterilization.89 
2. The Federal Government’s Role in Overseeing the Sector 
Responsibility for the food sector, from the homeland security perspective, is 
shared by the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the Department of Health and Human 
Services.  The USDA monitors the meat, poultry, and egg sectors, while HHS oversees 
production of all other food products.90  HHS implements a two-prong strategy to 
achieve a safe and reliable U.S. food sector.  Preventing food-borne illnesses is obviously 
the preferred approach, and this is the primary mission of the Center for Food Safety and 
Applied Nutrition (CFSAN).  Understanding that 100% prevention is not possible, HHS 
also maintains a significant outbreak response and investigation capabilities within the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).  Each of these strategic components 
is described in detail in the following paragraphs. 
Preventing a food-born illness in the United States is a monumental task.  In all, 
the CSFAN has oversight responsibility for 420,000 registered food establishments.91  
CFSAN tackles this problem with three main tools.  First, CSFAN produces industry 
guidelines on food safety, covering the full landscape of the food sector, from growers to 
harvesters to processors, even consumers.  Trace-back accountability is the one guideline 
that stands out as a key to food-born illness prevention.  Meticulous record-keeping is 
required to ensure any contaminated product can be linked to its source.  The second tool, 
food-related research, supports the first.  CFSAN invests some $30 million per year in 
food safety research, mostly aimed at better prevention of food contamination during 
processing.  Finally, the government relies on nearly 100 formal partnership agreements 
with various entities to implement its food safety inspection programs.  These partners 
                                                 
89 California Emergency Response Team, Investigation of an Escherichia coli O157:H7 Outbreak 
Associated with Dole Pre-Packaged Spinach, Sacramento, CA, March 2007, 4-16. 
90 The National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 3. 
91 American Society for Microbiology Position Statement on FY2007 FDA Budget Proposal, 
http://www.asm.org/Policy/index.asp?bid=41959, accessed Oct. 25, 2007. 
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include state and local governments as well as industry associations and third party 
inspectors, all of which agree to use FDA guidelines to inspect commercial food entities 
under their purview.  It should be noted that, while authorized, these third party reviews 
are not synonymous with, or a legal replacement for, an FDA inspection.92 
Responding to and investigating outbreaks of food-born illnesses are similarly 
daunting tasks.  The basic process involves identifying cases with confirmed presence of 
a known pathogen, then establishing the carrier vehicle for that pathogen.  CDC publishes 
these virus “fingerprints” electronically across the country through a database called 
PulseNet.  Given that food-born illnesses share symptoms with many normal maladies, 
there are often delays in confirmation of outbreaks as food related.  OutbreakNet is the 
CDC-sponsored network of health professionals who investigate food-born illnesses.93  
This ability to uniquely identify the virus and isolate its carrier vehicle, coupled with the 
CFSAN’s focus on trace-back accountability, constitutes the most critical federal 
capability for responding to any food-born outbreak. 
 
B. ANATOMY OF A FOOD-BORN ILLNESS OUTBREAK 
1. Context of the 2006 E. Coli Outbreak 
California produces nearly 75% of the leafy green vegetables consumed in the 
U.S.94  This virtual monopoly brings with it, however, much of the responsibility for the 
checkered history of food safety regarding these fresh vegetables.  In the eleven years 
leading up to the 2006 spinach scare, there had been nine E. coli outbreaks related to 
California-grown vegetables.  Most efforts to address this string of outbreaks were 
industry-led.  In 2005, the FDA had warned state officials and industry leaders that 
                                                 
92 “What Third Party Inspections Mean to You,” 
http://www.naturalproductsinsider.com/articles/470/470_461cert.html, accessed Oct. 25, 
2007. 
93 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Food Outbreak Detection and Surveillance,” available 
at http://www.cdc.gov/foodborneoutbreaks, accessed Oct. 25, 2007, 1-18. 
94 CBS News, “Salad Growers In a Spin Over E-Coli,” 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/09/13/health/main3257421.htm, accessed Oct. 22, 
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federal patience with local efforts was wearing thin.  A second warning letter made the 
federal opinion very clear:  “FDA is investigating regulatory options and will consider 
enforcement actions against firms and farms that grow, pack, or process fresh lettuce and 
leafy greens under insanitary [sic] conditions.”95 
After several years of planning, the California Food Emergency Response Team 
(CalFERT) was formed in 2005.  This partnership between federal, state, and industry 
players provides the investigative response to any food-born illness outbreak.  Most 
routine inspections of California growers are state-level reviews of handling process 
documentation.  Some growers and processors use third-party evaluators to provide 
objective oversight of their internal operations.  Despite these safety mechanisms, an 
investigation by CalFERT showed that many of the FDA’s repeated warnings regarding 
food safety had not been heeded.96 
2. Outbreak Events and Impacts 
The first official notification to the CDC of a suspected E. coli outbreak was made 
on September 8, 2006.  Wisconsin public health officials reported a cluster of cases, and 
had identified the strain of E. coli as O157:H7.  These results were posted to PulseNet, 
and by September 12, two additional states had confirmed the presence of the same 
strain.  Based on further research and patient interviews, officials in Wisconsin and 
Oregon notified the CDC on September 13 that they considered fresh spinach to be the 
likely carrier in this outbreak.  The following day, the FDA advised consumers 





                                                 
95 U.S. Food and Drug Administration, “Letter to California Firms that Grow, Pack, Process, or Ship 
Fresh and Fresh-cut Lettuce,” November, 2004, http://www.cfsan.fda/gov/~dms/prodltr2.html, 
accessed Oct. 19, 2007, 3. 
96 CalFERT, Investigation of an Escherichia coli O157:H7 Outbreak Associated with Dole Pre-
Packaged Spinach, 3-4. 
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processor in California announced a voluntary recall of all bagged spinach products.  One 
week later, FDA officials announced that the contamination had been isolated to three 
counties in California’s Central Coast Region.97 
CalFERT began its investigation on September 13.  Inspectors arrived at the 
suspected facility on September 15 and immediately began to review company 
documentation for product traceback information.  Affected lot numbers were identified 
on September 21, highlighting a batch of fresh-cut spinach harvested on August 14.  
Growers and harvesters associated with the suspect lot number were confirmed by 
September 24.  Multiple environmental samples were collected from four suspect farms, 
and the outbreak strain was identified in one of the four locations.98 
All told, the 2006 E. coli outbreak resulted in 203 confirmed infections, with over 
half (103) requiring hospitalization, and 3 deaths.99  Itemized cost estimates from this 
outbreak are difficult to obtain, but most estimates place the economic impact at 
approximately $100 million.100  The spinach sector operated in a degraded state for 30 
days.  Full operation of the sector was restored after 38 days.101  The following analysis 
will describe how the federal government’s regulator role affected the duration and the 
cost associated with this outbreak. 
                                                 
97 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Ongoing Multistate Outbreak of Escherichia coli 
serotype O157:H7 Infections Associated with Consumption of Fresh Spinach,” Sep 26, 2006 Press Release, 
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98 Investigation of an Escherichia coli O157:H7 Outbreak Associated with Dole Pre-Packaged 
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101 The judgment of the author was used to determine the length of this disruption.  Using the 
CalFERT final report chronology, the period of the degraded operations was determined to be the period of 
time the sector could have been generating contaminated spinach.  Full operations were deemed possible 
once the traceback accountability review had isolated the source of the contaminated spinach. 
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C. CASE ANALYSIS 
1. Overall Analysis 
CalFERT’s thorough investigation identified the outbreak strain of E. coli 
O157:H7 at one of the four implicated fields.  However, CalFERT investigators were 
unable to definitively determine how the spinach from that field became contaminated.  
Several possible methods of contamination were given, including the close proximity of 
fecal matter from grazing livestock and wildlife; contaminated irrigation water; and the 
use of animal manure as fertilizer.  Environmental samples from the processing locations 
were negative for the outbreak strain, eliminating the possibility of post-harvest 
contamination. Once the outbreak was underway, the public health response was 
adequate, though on the upper end of timelines given in CDC reporting guidelines.  The 
following analysis will discuss areas in both prevention and response where the 
government’s regulator role had an impact on the duration and cost of this outbreak.  
Specific problems included 1) lax guidance from the FDA; 2) weaknesses in the FDA 
inspection program; 3) cumbersome record-keeping for traceback accountability; and 4) 
inconsistent reporting from state and local entities to the CDC. 
2. Factors Contributing to Failed Prevention 
a. Lax Guidance From the FDA 
As a regulator of the food industry, the FDA provides a significant volume 
of guidance to the industry, covering every facet of the food production process from 
field operations to retail handling and storage.  This guidance was lacking or unclear in 
several areas directly related to this outbreak.  Consider the following quote from the 
FDA’s Guide to Minimize Microbial Food Safety Hazards of Fresh-Cut Fruits and 
Vegetables: 
 In general, anything that comes in contact with fresh produce has the 
potential to contaminate it.  Fresh produce may become contaminated at 
any point along the farm-to-table continuum.  The major source of 
microbial contamination of fresh produce is direct or indirect contact with 
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animal or human feces.  Once [it] has been contaminated, removing or 
killing the microbial pathogens is very difficult.  Prevention of microbial 
contamination at all steps of the farm-to-table continuum is preferable to 
treatment to eliminate contamination after is has occurred.102 
The guidance provided throughout the document either conflicts with or 
minimizes the importance of this prevention focus.  First, despite championing HACCP 
as a proven “prevention-based food safety system,” the FDA allows implementation of 
HACCP to remain optional for fresh-cut vegetable producers.103  Further, generic 
guidance is given relating to prevention of animal feces contact with plants in the field.  
Growers are advised to “maximize the time” between application of manure-based 
fertilizers and planting, but no timeframe is given.  Farmers are also encouraged to 
“consider sound measures” to keep waste from grazing cattle and other animals from 
entering fields during growing seasons; no source of these sound practices is given.104  
Both of these animal-related sources of contamination were cited as likely causes of this 
outbreak, yet neither is sufficiently addressed in FDA guidance. 
b. Weaknesses in the FDA Inspection Program 
The large and diverse food sector presents a challenging oversight 
problem to the FDA.  Despite calls for increased formal inspections, the FDA inspects 
food producers just once every 3.9 years.  This paucity of oversight is made worse by the 
fact that entities that fail inspections are not subject to fines or banishment from further 
food production.105  The FDA attempts to address this inability to provide timely 
oversight by encouraging producers to use third party evaluations to check their internal  
 
 
                                                 
102 Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, Guide to Minimize Microbial Food Safety Hazards 
of Fresh-Cut Fruits and Vegetables:  Draft Final Guidance, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, College 
Park, MD, 2007, 6. 
103 Ibid., 5. 
104 Ibid., 27. 
105 CBS News, “Salad Growers In a Spin Over E-Coli,” 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/09/13/health/main3257421.htm, accessed Oct. 22, 
2007. 
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processes.  These evaluators use FDA guidelines, and even receive FDA training, but 
their findings are not recognized as valid insofar as reducing the need for formal FDA 
visits. 
3. Factors Contributing to Slow Outbreak Response106 
a. Cumbersome Record Keeping for Traceback Accountability 
A linchpin of the outbreak investigation process is the ability to trace 
suspect produce back to the source of origin.  In this case, identification of spinach as the 
likely carrier occurred on September 13, 2006.  Lot codes printed on the packaging 
allowed investigators to quickly focus on one processing facility in California.  However, 
tracing the source of the spinach processed in the suspect lot number was difficult.  The 
facility in question uses manual record keeping to record all process flow information, 
such as receipt of produce from the field, product grading, processing equipment testing, 
as so on.  It took CalFERT investigators six additional days to trace the lot number to the 
fields of origin.  Automated record keeping would likely have shortened this research 
time significantly.  Local studies have shown that some processors have resisted efforts 
urging them to automate record keeping for traceback and other accountability 
information, mostly due to cost concerns.  This same study noted that those processors 
with automated record keeping systems completed traceback queries within an hour of 
the request.107 
b. Inconsistent Reporting from State and Local Entities to the CDC 
According to the CDC timeline for this outbreak, the earliest illness 
caused by the outbreak strain was diagnosed on August 19, 2006.  This case was 
                                                 
106 It should be noted that a 4-9 day lag time always occurs at the beginning of any E. coli outbreak 
investigation.  The incubation period of the pathogen is 3-4 days.  Further, the CDC also estimates that 
those impacted by the illness often delay seeking treatment by up to 5 days, if they seek treatment at all.   
Details on the reporting timeline can be found at http://www.cdc.gov/ecoli/reportingtimeline.htm, 
accessed Oct. 20, 2007. 
107 Gregory A. Baker, Ellen Farmer, and Ron Maysenhalder, Reforming the Fresh Produce Food 
Safety System, Food and Agribusiness Institute, Santa Clara University, San Jose, CA, 2006, 2-5. 
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discovered later in the investigation, as the first reported cluster of cases was announced 
on September 8.  This 3-week window is indicative of the reporting dilemma faced by 
CDC.  As mentioned earlier, patient evaluation is accomplished in local health facilities.  
When illnesses are confirmed as being caused by pathogens on the CDC watch list, they 
are reported via PulseNet.  Laboratory procedures and reporting protocols differ from 
location to location, so the timeliness of reporting can vary greatly.  Reducing this 
variance in reporting could make a significant difference the overall time needed to 
isolate the source of an outbreak. 
4. Analysis Summary 
As the CalFERT investigation showed, the 2006 E. coli outbreak was not a 
surprise occurrence in California.  The state had a long history of outbreaks, especially 
ones associated with leafy green vegetables.  The investigation also showed that the 
FDA’s inspection program had grown ineffective, with too much time between 
inspections and an over-reliance on industry self-inspection.  The state’s growers’ 
implementation of manual traceback accounting further delayed the isolation of suspect 
fields.  In response, growers have formed an industry association to develop more 
stringent guidelines, although these guidelines will not be mandatory.  As Chapter III of 
this thesis shows, this approach does not ensure success. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
A. SUMMARY OF CASE STUDY VARIABLES 
The goal of this thesis was to examine the impact of the various oversight roles 
assumed by the federal government on the restoration of different critical infrastructure 
sectors.  Specifically, each case was analyzed based on the economic impact of the 
downtime, time required to reach initial operating capability (IOC), and time required to 
restore full operating capability (FOC).  Table 1 provides a summary of the data from 
each case study.  The direct impact of the government role on each of these variables will 
be discussed in the following section. 










2001 Terrorist Attacks 
(Aviation) 
Owner $1.4 billion 4 Days 26 Days 
2003 Northeast 
Blackout (Electricity) 
Customer $6 billion 1 Day 4 Days 
2005 Hurricane Katrina 
(Telecommunications) 
Coordinator $0.7 billion 10 Days Ongoing 
2006 E. coli Outbreak 
(Food) 
Regulator $0.1 billion --- 30 Days 
 
Table 1.   Summary of Case Study Variables 
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B. CONCLUSIONS ON THE IMPACT OF THE GOVERNMENT ROLE 
1. Impact of Government Role on Cost 
Based on details of the cases, the role assumed by the federal government had no 
direct impact on the costs associated with each disruption.  The disparity in cost across 
the cases is the result of variations in the nature of the infrastructures involved.  For 
example, the loss of electricity affects virtually everyone in the impacted areas in a 
variety of ways from food spoilage to lost wages or productivity to actual repair costs.  
An aviation disruption, however, affects a much smaller segment of the population and 
the economy of the nation.  The nature of the disruption also affected costs.  The 
infrastructure costs associated with Hurricane Katrina were enormous, due mainly to the 
overwhelming physical destruction caused by the storm’s landfall and subsequent 
flooding.  The other cases saw limited physical impacts to the actual infrastructures, so 
the costs were mainly limited to lost wages and productivity. 
2. Impact of Government Role on Disruption Duration 
In three of the four cases, the government role had direct impacts on the duration 
of the disruption.  In the aviation case, the owner role had an overall negative impact on 
the duration.  The FAA’s dual mandate prevented its proper focus on domestic hijacking 
response measures, despite the fact the all of these response activities were within the 
purview of the federal government.  This lack of focus extended the time necessary to 
confirm the hijackings and to formulate a response.  These negative impacts were 
mitigated somewhat by the ability of the government to mandate interim security 
measures to facilitate the rapid resumption of air travel.  The overall impact of the owner 
role was a reduction of the time necessary to achieve the restoration of IOC and FOC in 
the aviation sector. 
The coordinator role had a similarly mixed impact on telecommunications 
restoration.  On the positive side, the FCC’s rapid coordination of regulatory waivers 
shortened the duration of the outage.  Conversely, the problematic implementation of 
access credential programs and poor prioritization of material requirements had negative 
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effects on restoration efforts.  The overall impact of the coordinator role in the 
telecommunications sector was positive, reducing the time for both IOC and FOC 
restoration. 
The regulator role had a mostly negative impact on restoration of the food sector.    
This negative impact was clear in two areas.  First, the delayed reporting between the 
local hospitals and laboratories and the CDC slowed the identification of the outbreak 
strain of E. coli.  Further, the FDA’s acceptance of and reliance upon manual traceback 
accounting records also extended the duration of the disruption by delaying the isolation 
of suspect fields.  This negative impact is not inherent in the regulator role, but 
specifically related to the FDA’s current structure.  The GAO has pointed out that the 
FDA lacks statutory recall authority for food, though it has such authority for 
pharmaceuticals.108  This reliance on voluntary recalls, coupled with the paltry inspection 
rate discussed in Chapter IV, further hampered the FDA’s effectiveness in this sector. 
C. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS/OBSERVATIONS 
1. An Ounce of Prevention Really is Worth a Pound of Cure 
While prevention was not one of the case variables measured in this study, it 
quickly emerged as a factor in three of the four cases.  The Northeast Blackout was 
initiated by ineffective management of vegetation along high-voltage lines, despite the 
existence of clear prevention measures in NERC guidelines.  The E. coli outbreak might 
have thwarted with stronger enforcement of the FDA’s proven detection methods.  Even 
the most infamous of the cases, the 9-11 attacks, was precipitated by a failure to properly 
screen passengers for proscribed items.  The world would be a different place today if 
these achievable prevention methods had been effectively employed. 
                                                 
108 Government Accountability Office, Food Safety:  USDA and FDA Need to Better Ensure Prompt 
and Complete Recalls of Potentially Unsafe Foods, Government Accountability Office, Washington, DC, 
2004, 2-5. 
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2. Let’s Not Relearn the Lessons of the Past 
As described in Chapter III of this thesis, the electricity sector learned a clear 
lesson that voluntary compliance enforcement does not work in a highly competitive 
industry.  The government responded to this lesson by making all NERC reliability 
guidelines mandatory in the Energy Policy Act of 2005.109  Unfortunately, other sectors 
have not learned from this.  The FDA is allowing the food sector to respond to the most 
recent E. coli outbreak with voluntary, industry-developed guidelines.  DHS and the FCC 
are following a similar path of allowing the telecommunications industry develop its own 
protection standards for voluntary compliance.  A quick study of the power sector would 
show that a more rigorous approach is needed. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
This study has highlighted three areas relevant to critical infrastructure protection 
which warrant further study.  First, in assigning sector specific agencies to oversee the 
various infrastructure sectors, DHS has in some cases chosen the industry regulators 
while assigning other sectors to less directly related agencies.  NERC has asserted that 
market and reliability decisions cannot be effectively made separately.110  Testing this 
statement, in light of the oversight assignments made be DHS, would be beneficial.   A 
related study would be to examine whether the weaknesses in the roles displayed in these 
cases are inherent in the role, or more related to the particular disruption.  Finally, another 
interesting and useful study would be to examine whether a structure similar to NERC 
would applicable in the telecommunications sector.  The two sectors are similar in the 
level of industry cooperation and coordination required, so attempting to apply the NERC 
model to telecommunications might prove worthwhile. 
 
                                                 
109 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Energy Policy Act of 2005 Fact Sheet, U.S. Department 
of Energy, Washington, DC, 3-4. 
110 Final Report on the August 14, 2003 Blackout in the United States and Canada:  Causes and 
Recommendations, 104. 
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